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Jack Goldsmith’s Power and 
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Baher Azmy* 
In his insightful and highly readable new book, Power and 
Constraint, Jack Goldsmith argues that contrary to popular 
perception, executive branch activity in our enduring, post-9/11 
era has been adequately constrained by a range of novel forces 
such human rights groups, government lawyers and journalists 
and that such constraints have, in turn, produced a public and 
political consensus that the current balance between national 
security policies and civil and human rights is “legitimate.”  
This review takes issue with Goldsmith’s perspective on the 
capacity of the entities he praises to meaningfully check war-
time Executive Branch practices and contests Goldsmith’s 
methodologically flawed attempt to transform his positivist 
description of the way things are into a normative conclusion 
that this is the way things ought to be in our constitutional 
system.  This review also identifies a perceptible bias in 
Goldsmith’s analysis that heavily preferences an aggressive 
national security regime, while discounting harms to the victims 
of that regime’s excesses, and argues that Goldsmith 
undervalues important metrics of accountability that should 
cause us to doubt seriously that we have a properly constrained 
the presidency or that our current state of affairs is 
constitutionally legitimate.  
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I. Introduction 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law has 
understandably chosen to recognize Jack Goldsmith’s latest book, 
Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11,1 as 
part of this year’s Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War 
Crimes Symposium. It is a thoughtful and very readable account of 
the dynamic political, legal, and military forces that shaped and 
ultimately limited executive-branch policy making around a host of 
asserted war-making activities such as targeting, detention, and 
surveillance in the tumultuous decade following 9/11.  
Goldsmith’s project and his perspective are optimistic, some 
would even say Panglossian.2 He seeks to demonstrate that, despite 
depictions of lawlessness, secrecy, and cruelty associated with 
counterterrorism policies of the past decade—and primarily occurring 
in George W. Bush’s first term—the executive branch has in fact 
come to be meaningfully constrained by a complex, inter-related, and 
decidedly modern set of mechanisms. Those mechanisms have made 
the commander-in-chief democratically accountable and subject to a 
system of checks and balances that, while different from the structural 
ones contemplated by James Madison, are equally effective in limiting 
executive branch transgressions throughout what may well be an 
1. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012). 
2. See Jonathan Hafetz, American Exceptionalism (or “The Best of All 
Possible Worlds”), BALKINIZATION BLOG (Apr. 2, 2012), http://balkin. 
blogspot.com/2012/04/american-exceptionalism-or-best-of-all.html. 
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endless war. Goldsmith’s provocative thesis—supported as it is, by 
first-person interviews from a variety of participants on all sides of 
the decade’s legal drama and benefitting from some temporal distance 
from key events—will surely populate syllabi addressing the post-9/11 
legal landscape for years to come, alongside other important and 
decidedly less sanguine works that have excoriated the Yoo-
Addington-Cheney legal paradigm that operated in the early-to-
middle years of the Bush Administration.3  
As readable as Goldsmith’s account is, however, it suffers from 
notable methodological flaws and ultimately comes to a highly 
contestable substantive judgment about the virtue of the present state 
of affairs. These facets of his analysis appear to be driven by a 
significant bias that preferences American exceptionalism and might 
over the substantial human suffering caused by those same forces. On 
the methodological side, Goldsmith’s analysis falls into a basic 
philosophical trap, the “is-ought problem” (also known as “Hume’s 
Law”).4 That is, Goldsmith appears to make normative judgments 
about how the world of accountability ought to be, from largely 
positivist premises about the way the world is; he labels, it seems, this 
determinist account of the current state of affairs as “legitimate.” His 
normative conclusion—that, in effect, this is the best of all possible 
worlds—does not follow from his positivist (and too rosy, in my view) 
depiction of the status quo. Indeed, it is undermined by some striking 
3. For just the slimmest sampling of this perspective, see, e.g., JANE 
MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); JOE 
MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
(2006); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2008); 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE IDEA THAT IS AMERICA: KEEPING FAITH 
WITH OUR VALUES IN A DANGEROUS WORLD (2007); TIM WEINER, 
LEGACY OF ASHES: A HISTORY OF THE CIA (2008); JAMES RISEN, STATE 
OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2006); JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 
9/11 (2011); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARTZ & AZIZ HUQ, UNCHECKED AND 
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2008); 
BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008); RON 
SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT 
OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 (2006); MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND 
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); THE 
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA (Karen Greenberg ed., 2005); ALFRED W. 
MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION FROM THE COLD 
WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2006); DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND 
DEMOCRACY (2009); DAVID D. COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY (2006); DAVID D. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE 
STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM (2005).  
4. See DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (1776). 
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statements that bespeak a failure to fairly evaluate the competing 
interests at stake. For example, he regards the ethics investigation 
into John Yoo’s instrumentalist memos authorizing torture as 
“brutal,” saying nothing about the actual brutality of the 
interrogations and violence Yoo ratified.5 To take another, he 
credulously asserts that all of the remaining Guantanamo detainees 
are the “worst of the worst” “terrorist soldiers,”6 a claim that is so 
sloppy and manifestly false,7 it would appear to call into question the 
balance of his entire legitimacy analysis.  
However, having identified what I believe is a perceptible bias in 
his perspective, I must make a full disclosure of my own. I am a long-
standing member of the Guantanamo Bay Bar Association, the 
collection of thousands pro bono attorneys described in Goldsmith’s 
book, who have represented hundreds of Guantanamo detainees in 
habeas proceedings following the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. 
Bush.8 And I have recently assumed the role of Legal Director of the 
Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a human rights litigation 
and advocacy organization Goldsmith places at the center of the legal 
battles seeking access to justice for Guantanamo detainees and 
accountability for torture and human rights abuses committed by 
U.S. officials in connection with the Bush Administration’s “war on 
terror.” Goldsmith credits CCR president and leading human rights 
lawyer, Michael Ratner, for filing the first habeas cases in 2002 
challenging the legality of the Guantanamo detentions, when few 
 
5. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 110. 
6. See, e.g., id. at 231.  
7. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Guantanamo Detainees Cleared for Release but 
Left in Limbo, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2011, http://articles.wash 
ingtonpost.com/2011-11-08/national/35282416_1_guantanamo-
detainees-guantanamo-bay-home-nations (reporting that the Obama 
Administration cleared 126 men for transfer from Guantanamo after a 
comprehensive review about their dangerousness and detainability); see 
also Guantanamo by the Numbers, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS, http:// 
ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/guantanamo-numbers-what-you-should-
know-and-do-about-guantanamo (last visited Feb. 18 2013) (noting that 
86 of the 166 remaining men at Guantanamo have been cleared for 
transfer); Michael Mone, Jr., Opinion, Wait Continues for Cleared 
Guantanamo Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2013, http://www. 
bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/02/17/wait-continues-for-cleared-guanta 
namo-detainees/ZVAjgvfz40i5ZRJpYD0CcP/story.html (telling story of 
thirty- year-old Syrian detainee who has been cleared for transfer from 
Guantanamo); Wells Dixon, President Obama Must Veto Defense Bill to 
Close Gitmo, THE HILL, Dec. 20, 2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/congr 
ess-blog/homeland-security/273849-president-obama-must-veto-defense-
bill-to-close-gitmo (telling story of Djamel Ameziane, an innocent 
detainee who has been cleared for transfer by the Bush and Obama 
Administrations but still languishes in Guantanamo).  
8. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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others dared take on such an unpopular cause.9 But Goldsmith also 
contends that the litigation not only failed to achieve its initial 
aims—i.e., ending indefinite, preventive detention—the litigation 
actually set in motion a series of judicial decisions and executive 
actions that ultimately legitimated these policies under the law and 
popular perception.  
Of the many facets of Goldsmith’s account, this is the one I am 
most interested in, and not just because it surely has a sting to it. 
After all, no human rights lawyer wants to hear that she has solidified 
or validated the very system she finds immoral and dedicated her life 
to changing. Still, putting aside the literary allure of the “be-careful-
what-you-wish-for” trope, Goldsmith’s characterization of the state of 
the world today is neither entirely accurate nor fair. In what follows, I 
first intend to demonstrate that this facet of his book’s conclusion—
that various aspects of U.S. counterterrorism policy (especially around 
detention, targeting and surveillance) now have legal legitimacy—
suffers from some significant methodological flaws: the empirical 
foundation for his claim of “legitimacy” is uncertain, at best. After 
spending a little more time questioning Goldsmith’s perspective, I 
then seek to show that the system of “accountability” that Goldsmith 
endorses remains fundamentally unjust and will be judged so by 
important criteria that Goldsmith undervalues. Finally, I suggest 
Goldsmith’s policy recommendation for a robust executive national 
security paradigm may produce a paradox that would sting far more 
harshly than the one Goldsmith attributes to CCR’s work.  
II. A Rosy Presidential Synopticon 
Goldsmith posits that we have developed a healthy system of 
presidential accountability—a push and pull equilibrium in which 
various actors inside and outside of the government (e.g., journalists, 
whistleblowers, government agency Inspectors General, military 
lawyers, human rights NGOs), responded to the extra-legal actions of 
the first-term Bush Administration and exposed, litigated, publicized, 
and ultimately forced a change in the worst executive-branch 
practices related to things such as incommunicado detention, 
extraordinary rendition, secret CIA prisons, and torture.10 He catalogs 
the ways in which these actors played a meaningful part in 
supplementing and energizing the role of traditional institutions—the 
courts and Congress—in checking extra-legal Bush Administration 
activities,11 even as he gives some of these actors more credit than 
9. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 161–201 (detailing the efforts of the 
Guantanamo Bar Association, spearheaded by CCR and Michael 
Ratner).  
10. Id. at xi.  
11. See, e.g., id. at 209.  
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they probably themselves believe they deserve. He regards their 
modest successes as particularly novel and noteworthy in light of the 
traditional deference given to the president during times of crisis.  
What seems most important to Goldsmith is that the cumulative 
response of these actors to emergency actions of the Bush 
Administration—the “ecology of transparency”12 they created—is 
actually durable and sustainable. These actors can, and should, in his 
view, remain in place to scrutinize and constrain future executive 
wartime practices. Goldsmith believes that these forces have inverted 
the traditional assumptions regarding the awesome and intimidating 
power of the state, including its consistent capacity to surveil and 
control its citizens.13 Instead of (or at least in addition to) a 
Benthamite, state-created panopticon, a device in which one can 
monitor many, Goldsmith believes we live in a synopticon, in which 
these many actors can consistently monitor and control one: the 
presidency. For Goldsmith, this dynamic produces a happy stasis of 
presidential power checked by presidential accountability, where the 
president can do just enough to robustly pursue national security 
policy, bolstered by a legitimacy that comes from persistent legal 
scrutiny.  
In subsequent sections of this essay, I offer some normative 
critiques of what I believe to be Goldsmith’s overly optimistic model. 
In the meantime, it is worth briefly considering the role he ascribes to 
some of the key actors, both to understand the substance of his 
argument and to notice the often rosy shading of his perspective. 
A. Journalists 
Goldsmith observes that “accountability journalism” played a 
prominent role in the “ecology of transparency” by exposing deep 
secrets about illegal or extra-legal activity of the Bush 
Administration.14 For example, Dana Priest of the Washington Post 
(and later Barton Gellman of the same) defied the pleading of 
national security officials in the Bush Administration and published 
bombshell reports about an archipelago of secret prisons being run by 
the CIA in foreign countries.15 Jane Mayer’s remarkable reporting in 
12. Goldsmith borrows this term from Seth Kriemer. See id. at 118 (citing 
Seth Kriemer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of 
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1016 (2008)).  
13. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 212 (noting the increased ability of 
journalists and others to access government information and documents) 
14. See id. at 51–82. 
15. See id. at 55–56; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret 
Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html; Dana 
Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends 
28 
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the New Yorker also highlighted the dubious legality of the Bush 
Administration’s “extraordinary rendition” program and torture and 
interrogation regimes in Guantanamo and other U.S. prisons, 
reporting which culminated in her comprehensive take-down of the 
extra-legal paradigm inspired by Dick Cheney’s reference to working 
on the “Dark Side.”16 Likewise, Eric Lichtblau and James Risen 
published explosive reports in the New York Times regarding a 
massive, secret, warrantless wiretapping program (the “Terrorist 
Surveillance Program”) in the United States run by the National 
Security Agency.17  
Goldsmith rightly credits Priest’s (and presumably Mayer’s) 
reporting with influencing the part of the Supreme Court’s 2006 
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,18 ruling that Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions applied to al-Qaeda suspects and thus 
banned “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” of individuals 
presumably held in these secret prisons.19 (Much like, as Goldsmith 
emphasizes, CBS’s reporting of torture in Abu Ghraib must have 
informed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul v. Bush20 and Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,21 to ensure some judicial oversight of executive detention 
operations.22) This, in turn, likely contributed to the Bush 
Administration’s decision in 2006 to modify interrogation practices 
and move detainees from the CIA prisons into the comparative light 
of day at Guantanamo.23 Goldsmith observes that journalistic exposés 
must have depended upon leakers within the government, who were 
uncomfortable with executive practices and eager to impose some 
constraints themselves. Overall, this reporting contributed eventually 
to public disapprobation of the worst of Bush Administration 
practices and when combined with the distance from the smoke of 
Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, http://www.washingtonpo 
st.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356 .html.  
16. See MAYER, supra note 3, at 9.  
17. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.  
18. 548 U.S. 557 (2008).  
19. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 180–81; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 625–26 (2006).  
20. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
21. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
22. See generally Abuse at Abu Gharib, CBS, http://www.cbsnews.com/ele 
ments/2004/05/05/iraq/interactivehomemenu615771.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2013).  
23. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 56.  
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9/11, contributed to the diminishment in the public and the courts of 
Cheney’s “Dark Side” paradigm.24  
Goldsmith also finds that the massive disclosure and publication 
of government documents by Bradley Manning and Wikileaks is 
notable because of the significant technological capacity to copy and 
distribute enormous amounts of data: it can happen at the click of a 
button, without the laborious page-by-page Xeroxing that Daniel 
Ellsberg undertook forty years ago.25 This, in turn, makes it harder 
for the government to conceal secrets. A dynamic Goldsmith appears 
to endorse without acknowledging that recent, aggressive crackdowns 
on whistleblowers and other Espionage Act prosecutions by the 
Obama Administration26 (not to mention the brutal treatment of 
Bradley Manning27) make this accountability system less sustainable 
and less effective than several years earlier. Indeed, in this context, 
the hypocritical failure of facets of accountability Goldsmith describes 
is evidenced by the government’s prosecution of former CIA official 
John Kiraikou for leaking the names of CIA officials involved in the 
CIA interrogation program while demurring from any meaningful 
investigation or punishment of CIA officials for the creation or 
implementation of torture.28  
To be sure, the work of these and other path-breaking journalists 
is emblematic of the highest ethical standards and consistent with the 
Fourth Estate’s role in our democracy. Still, there are important 
reasons to hesitate before crediting modern journalism with providing 
as robust a check to executive branch power as Goldsmith suggests. 
As Goldsmith concedes in passing, journalists (some from the very 
same major papers lauded above) failed in questioning, let alone 
preventing, the catastrophic and falsely premised build up to the war 
24. See id. at 57. See also SAVAGE, supra note 3, 154.  
25. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 73–79. 
26. See Adam Liptak, A High Tech War on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/a-high-tech-
war-on-leaks.html?pagewanted=all (describing series of controversial 
prosecutions of leakers of information of public concern); Cora Currier, 
Sealing Loose Lips: Charting Obama’s Course on Leaks, PROPUBLICA 
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/special/sealing-loose-lips-
charting-obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks (describing six 
prosecutions of leakers or journalists under Espionage Act of 1917, 
initiated by the Obama Administration).  
27. See Ashley Frantz, Through Supporters, Bradley Manning Still Fights, 
CNN (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/21/world/bradley-
manning-update/index.html (describing the U.S. military’s holding of 
Bradley Manning since May 2010). 
28. See Charlie Savage, Former C.I.A. Operative Pleads Guilty in Lead of 
Colleague’s Name, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at A6.  
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in Iraq.29 In light of the subsequent mayhem, destruction, and official 
incompetence, this was no small oversight. Why this dramatic failure? 
In part because, as history teaches us, journalists, like citizens and 
court, often get caught up and manipulated by the patriotic push for 
war, with its attendant invocations of the American virtue and 
exaggerated assertions of harm that would follow absent invasion. 
This lasts, as in Vietnam and Iraq, until this narrative is 
overwhelmed by facts on the ground. The Bush Administration’s 
manipulation of the media in the run-up to the Iraq war should make 
us less certain of the ability of journalism to consistently and durably 
meet the challenge of checking executive branch misconduct. 
Equally important, is the problem Donald Rumsfeld famously 
identified as “unknown-unknowns.”30 Journalists can only publish 
what has been leaked to them, and not even the most aggressive 
journalist can do anything to expose abuse the government manages 
to keep secret. That obvious and overwhelming asymmetry of 
information and power necessarily precludes an efficient system of 
accountability. This power dynamic also renders Goldsmith’s 
assessment about an emerging public consensus or “legitimacy” 
around national security policy dubious.31 
B. Government Insider and Outsider Watchdogs 
Goldsmith also identifies the development of lawyers inside the 
government who serve as Inspectors General within government 
agencies or who are appointed by the Justice Department to 
undertake special investigations as a piece of his synopticon. 
Goldsmith explains that Congress created these offices for the express 
purpose of monitoring executive branch activities and then reporting 
back to Congress in a speedier and more thorough manner than 
Congress could accomplish itself.32 To Goldsmith, the force of these 
internal government watchdogs comes as much from the novelty of 
such agency oversight as from the consequences of their actions. For 
29. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 56–57 (“The press stumbled badly in 
its coverage of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) rationale for 
the 2003 Iraq war.”).  
30. Hillary Profita, Known Knowns, Known Unknowns and Unknown 
Unknowns: A Retrospective, CBS (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.cbsnews. 
com/8301-500486_162-2165872-500486.html. 
31. Naturally, journalistic pressure also tends toward publication of stories 
that are dramatic and sensational, such as secret CIA detention and 
torture centers, as less accolade or reward is lavished on reporters who 
develop stories that are less graphic or visceral, such as concerns about 
data mining, the PATRIOT Act, or the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court. The results of that incentive structure also produce 
significant accountability gaps.  
32. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 105. 
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example, Goldsmith marvels that CIA Inspector General John 
Helgerson was seeking documents and information from CIA officials 
actually contemporaneous with their involvement in detention and 
interrogation operations and policy making; this kind of intervention 
was unprecedented and burdensome.33 Yet, any surprise over the 
assertedly unprecedented scope or force of these investigations should 
be moderated when one acknowledges that the CIA’s broad control of 
U.S. detention and interrogation operations was itself unprecedented 
in the agency’s history.34 In any event, it is unclear that, other than 
forcing CIA officials to bear the pestering inquiries the Inspector 
General, the Inspector General or his reporting was responsible for 
meaningfully constraining CIA behavior.35  
Goldsmith similarly praises Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s 
decision in 2008 to appoint a special Department of Justice 
prosecutor, John Durham, to look into the quite narrow question of 
whether former CIA Official Jose Rodriguez unlawfully ordered the 
destruction of ninety-two videotapes depicting interrogation (and 
likely torture) of CIA-detainee Abu Zubaydah.36 Note, the 
investigation was not for purposes of deciding whether Zubaydah (or 
others) were tortured in violation our basic commitments to human 
rights law, but to examine whether the CIA destroyed evidence in 
violation of a more parochial legal duty. In any case, Durham chose 
not to bring any criminal charges even related to this narrow inquiry. 
Attorney General Eric Holder then commissioned Durham to 
investigate whether any CIA officials should be held criminally 
responsible for torture or deaths of detainees in U.S. custody. Again, 
he declined to prosecute any CIA officials for violation of the criminal 
33. Id. at 109–10.  
34. See WEINER, supra note 3, at 482 (“[T]he CIA [after 9/11] began to 
function as a global military police, throwing hundreds of suspects into 
secret jails in Afghanistan, Thailand, Poland, and inside the American 
military prison in Guantanamo, Cuba. It handed hundreds more 
prisoners off to the intelligence services in Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and 
Syria for interrogations.”). 
35. Goldsmith notes that Helgerson was principled and respected, and that 
his work culminated in a comprehensive report in 2004 about the CIA’s 
“Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.” GOLDSMITH, 
supra note 1, at 103. He notes that much of the report was actually 
laudatory of the CIA, and for criticism, the report merely “documented 
some ill-considered or illegal actions that had taken place prior to the 
establishment of the CIA’s formal detention and interrogation program, 
and explained that many aspects of the program, especially in the early 
days, were poorly organized and managed.” Id. at 104. This critique of 
CIA behavior does not seem commensurate with CIA wrongdoing and 
thus does not appear to me to be a useful example of accountability.  
36. Id. at 111. 
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torture statute, or for the deaths of detainees in CIA custody,37 even 
though it is clear that CIA officials engaged in waterboarding, stress 
positions, mock executions, threatening with handguns and power 
drills, vowing to kill or rape members of a detainee’s family, and 
inducing vomiting, among other horrible things.38  
Goldsmith sees no problem with such a conclusion, which to many 
inside and outside the United States appears bewildering and leads to 
some considerable cynicism regarding the authenticity, rigor, and 
scope of the investigation.39 Indeed, Goldsmith argues that what 
makes the result just and the CIA legitimately “accountable,” is that 
CIA officials felt hampered by the investigation and its requirement 
37. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Closure of 
Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-ag-
1067.html (“Based on the fully developed factual record concerning the 
two deaths, the Department has declined prosecution because the 
admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
38. See generally C.I.A. Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/ce
ntral_intelligence_agency/cia_interrogations/index.html. 
39. Human Rights advocate and long-time proponent of accountability for 
criminal actors in the Bush Administration, Scott Horton wrote in 
response to Attorney General Holder’s announcement that Durham had 
exercised prosecutorial discretion in declining to bring charges:  
These outcomes should once again focus international attention 
on the Justice Department’s conduct. Mandatory provisions of 
the Convention Against Torture should have compelled the 
department to open criminal inquiries into cases in which 
concrete and credible allegations of torture exist. It failed even 
to open inquiries in almost all such cases, and in the tiny 
handful of cases in which inquiries were opened, Justice 
Department figures were busy murmuring assurances from the 
outset that these investigations were a mere formality, and that 
actual prosecutions were unlikely. So did Durham conduct a 
bona fide investigation? We can never know the answer to that 
question because everything that Durham did was cloaked—as 
proper process in fact requires—in secrecy.  
 Scott Harper, Holder Announces Impunity for Torutre-Homicides, 
HARPERS MAG. ONLINE (Aug. 31, 2012), http://harpers.org/blog/ 
2012/08/holder-announces-impunity-for-torture-homocides/. Similarly, 
Elisa Massimino, the president of Human Rights First, a group that 
includes prosecutors, attorneys, and former judges, and which has 
published a comprehensive accounting of the CIA torture-murder cases, 
responded, “It is hugely disappointing that with ample evidence of 
torture, and documented cases of some people actually being tortured to 
death, that the Justice Department has not been able to mount a 
successful prosecution and hold people responsible for their crimes.” 
Scott Shane, No Charges Filed in Two Deaths Involving C.I.A., N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1. 
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that they spend hours on the “distracting and psychologically 
draining process” of refreshing their memories and digging through 
thousands of documents.40 Administrative burden should not be a 
valid metric for government accountability. Indeed, Goldsmith misses 
a bigger, more problematic point. Presumably, Durham declined to 
prosecute any CIA officials who relied on advice of government 
lawyers, such as John Yoo and Jay Bybee, the authors of the the 
shameful Torture Memos. But a system in which government lawyers 
create objectively implausible legal interpretations to immunize ex 
ante, otherwise illegal activity—i.e., to create the proverbial Golden 
Shield—is hardly a system that one can plausibly hold up as 
accountable. 
And, what about Yoo and Bybee, the paradigmatic wrongdoers in 
the Bush Administration? A finding by a Justice Department Ethics 
Investigator (a kind of Inspector General, which is a mechanism of 
accountability lauded by Goldsmith) that Yoo and Bybee committed 
legal malpractice in authoring the Torture Memos was overturned by 
a Senior Justice Department official on the grounds that the 
investigators “themselves had done shoddy work.”41 Goldsmith is 
again comfortable with this seemingly neutered outcome from an 
Inspector General, because, “[n]o Justice Department lawyer has ever 
been subject to this kind of scrutiny.”42 The complaint about 
unprecedented administrative burden again elides an obvious response 
about the unprecedented breach by a Justice Department lawyer. 
More importantly, as argued in more detail below, this burden theory 
of accountability is a distressingly thin theory of accountability.  
Goldsmith adds some strange company to this cast of government 
watchdogs: the ACLU. He focuses in particular on Jameel Jaffer’s 
genuinely impressive efforts (along with other unmentioned and 
talented ACLU lawyers such as Amrit Singh and the lawyers at the 
Gibbons PC law firm in New Jersey) to obtain documents related to 
Bush Administration torture and interrogation practices, as part of a 
massive Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation. As Goldsmith 
observes, the litigation forced the government to release, against its 
strong will, thousands of embarrassing documents that shed troubling 
light on administration torture programs and which, in Goldsmith’s 
eyes, “propelled Jameel Jaffer from an unknown and inexperienced 
lawyer to a hero of progressive litigation, a man at the vanguard of 
the national security bar who used the courts and the FOIA in new 
ways to extract the government’s darkest national security secrets.”43  
40. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 111.  
41. Id. at 110.  
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 117.  
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But Jaffer himself does not share Goldsmith’s enthusiastic view of 
FOIA as a meaningful accountability tool in the national security 
context. Jaffer thinks the ACLU was fortunate to draw Judge Alan 
Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York on the case. 
Furthermore, only a small fraction of the documents the ACLU 
sought were actually disclosed and only after literally thousands and 
thousands of painstaking hours of effort.44 Indeed, the Second Circuit 
in that case, like so many courts in other national security cases, has 
since adopted a highly limited deferential view of the court’s authority 
to question executive branch classification decisions.45  
Goldsmith must be well aware of the often Orwellian limitations 
of the FOIA mechanism. After all, a federal court in the District of 
Columbia has endorsed the CIA’s refusal to acknowledge even the 
existence of the very targeted killing program that Goldsmith 
discusses in his book.46 Another district court, in New York Times v. 
Department of Justice,47— a case which sought to obtain disclosure of 
legal memoranda justifying the Obama Administration’s targeted 
killing program—observed the “Alice-in-Wonderland nature” of the 
government’s position in the case.  In denying the plaintiffs’ request 
for access for the legal justification for targeted killings, the court 
explained it felt caught in “a veritable Catch-22,” leaving it “no way 
44. See id. 
45. See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 681 F.3d 61, 75–76 (2d Cir. 
2012) (concluding that national security exemption to FOIA justified 
government from withholding portions of an OLC memoranda that 
revealed, among other things, a picture of CIA detainee and subject of 
waterboarding, Abu Zubaydah); see also Wilner v. Nat’l Security 
Agency, 592 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2009) (accepting NSA’s “Glomar” response 
to FOIA request seeking information about government surveillance of 
attorneys representing Guantanamo detainees); Amnesty Int’l USA v. 
CIA, 728 F.Supp.2d 479, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (crediting nearly all of 
CIA’s claimed national security exemptions to disclosure of information 
regarding interrogation, torture and rendition of detainees in CIA 
custody); Azmy v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 592 F.Supp.2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (relating to requests regarding information about released 
Guantanamo detainee, accepting Defense Department’s claims of risk to 
national security).  
46. See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280, 301 (D.D.C. 
2011). Goldsmith criticizes the CIA’s Glomar response in this case, more 
out of frustration over the selective and strategic leaking by the Obama 
Administration about details of its targeting killing program, than 
because of a desire for robust judicial review of executive-branch 
classification decisions. See Jack Goldsmith, Thoughts on Today’s 
Important Drone FOIA Oral Argument in DC Circuit, LAWFARE (Sept. 
20, 2012, 6:34 a.m.), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/thoughts-on-
todays-important-drone-foia-oral-argument-in-dc-circuit/. 
47. New York Times v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nos. 11 Civ. 9336(CM), 12 Civ. 
794(CM), 2013 WL 50209, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2013). 
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around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the 
executive branch of our government to proclaim as perfectly lawful 
certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our 
Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a 
secret.”48 
That Goldsmith is able to look past FOIA’s serious limitations 
and still sunnily praise the statute as “a more salient and powerful 
accountability tool”49 that will permit future Jaffers to get at secret 
government documents or as a meaningful and durable weapon to 
exact national security secrets from the executive branch suggests 
Goldsmith maintains a far lower threshold than current and future 
Jaffers in evaluating government accountability. In the war for 
executive accountability, FOIA is a slingshot attempting to pierce the 
tank armor of government secrecy and over-classification.  
C. Warrior Lawyers 
Goldsmith observes that the military itself (much like every 
aspect of our society) has incorporated law and lawyers into nearly 
every aspect of its operations, including killing operations.50 He 
explains that, after the embarrassments of the Vietnam era—and 
more solidified norms regarding international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, and global public scrutiny of military 
wrongdoing—lawyers became an increasingly important part of the 
military decision-making process. Goldsmith in particular highlights 
the integrated role lawyers have played in military targeting decisions, 
in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as those decisions unlike in the 
World War II era, are expressly constrained by laws of war. He notes 
also that lawyers were involved in developing criteria for individuals 
subject to “targeted killing” by drones.  
Here, too, Goldsmith may be overemphasizing the significance of 
this set of actors in creating a meaningful accountability system. 
Indeed, Goldsmith seems to contort a bit to account for the serious 
failure of certain lawyers to constrain the worst of Bush 
Administration practices in the area of detention and interrogation. 
How can this failure be reconciled with his perspective on the positive 
influence of government lawyers? All Goldsmith offers on this score is 
that, despite all the resources and training poured into ensuring 
“lawful action in targeting and in rules of engagement more 
generally,” the military “allowed itself to be relatively unprepared for 
detention operations.”51 We know what happened as a result. Put this 
48. Id. 
49. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 117.  
50. See id. at 125–60 (discussing the historical development of the role of 
lawyers in military operations).  
51. Id. at 147.  
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way, this seems a significant concession against his argument. Yet, 
there’s a deeper problem. Lawyers of course were involved in 
detention decisions and, it is the result of that involvement that we 
got torture, incommunicado detention in Guantanamo, and Abu 
Ghraib. Office of Legal Counsel lawyers in DOJ wrote memos 
recommending that detention operations be located outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States, that the Geneva Conventions would 
not apply to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and insurgents in Iraq, and that 
universally condemned methods of torture were permissible as a 
matter of statutory construction or constitutional law.52 If the 
presence of lawyers in making national security policy is, of itself, 
proof of an accountable presidency, how can we account for the very 
worst excesses of the Bush Administration, which had the official 
sanction of law? In World War II, Franklin Roosevelt and his military 
commanders did not need a team of lawyers to believe that the 
United States should respect the Geneva Conventions in detaining 
Japanese and German soldiers, despite similar ambiguity claimed by 
Bush Administration lawyers regarding the Conventions’ 
applicability.53 The presence of lawyers does not guarantee legal 
legitimacy. 
D. The Guantanamo Bar  
The most interesting and vexing piece of Goldsmith’s 
accountability puzzle is his account of the role played by human 
rights groups, which mounted a sustained and in many ways 
successful challenge to the Bush Administration’s detention practices 
and, in Goldsmith’s view remain trigger ready to push back against 
future executive transgressions. The account has a dramatic arc. It 
starts with CCR’s president and “left-wing” “radical” lawyer54 
Michael Ratner choosing (along with accomplished civil rights lawyer, 
Joe Margulies, who regrettably goes unmentioned) to do what no 
other human rights group dared to do in 2002: file a habeas corpus 
petition on behalf of Shafiq Rasul and other detainees being held 
52. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra 
note 3 (collecting the Torture Memos and providing general 
background). 
53. See MARGULIES, supra note 3, at 74–75. 
54. The classification of Michael Ratner of “far-left” and CCR as “radical” 
is good for dramatic effect. But fundamentally, there was nothing 
politically radical about the case, as the years since its initiation have 
borne out, manifested by, among other things, a number of Supreme 
Court rulings siding with detainees, and the mass mobilization of 
thousands of lawyers into the Guantanamo Bay Bar Association. This 
effort sought the application of the most elementary human rights and 
constitutional principles in the face of a startling arrogation of executive 
power.  
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incommunicado in Guantanamo, at a time when emotions from 9/11 
were still raw and strong.55 The administration confidently boasted 
that Guantanamo housed only the “worst of the worst,” or among 
“the most viscous, best-trained killers on earth.”56  
Goldsmith quotes Ratner’s belief that, at the time it was filed, the 
petition had no chance. But that is likely not because, as Goldsmith 
himself believes, “[t]he legal precedents, looked at dispassionately, did 
not permit Ratner’s clients to go to court.”57 On the contrary, as the 
Court ultimately came to view the question in Rasul and Boumediene, 
legal principles do support extending the reach of the great writ to 
territories, such as Guantanamo, over which the jailer exercises 
control over the prisoner, and where the executive seeks deliberately 
to evade the reach of the writ.58 And, as Ratner believed at time of 
filing, the precedent Goldsmith thinks is controlling, the enigmatic 
1950 case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,59 was easily and correctly 
distinguished by the Court because the petitioners there were housed 
in foreign territory and had already received an opportunity to 
challenge the lawfulness of their detention via lengthy military 
tribunal.60 Thus, Ratner was certain he would lose in 2002 primarily 
because he is (like Goldsmith is, in this account) a legal realist and 
knows that courts cannot always review precedent dispassionately or 
politics with a long-term orientation, particularly in the fever of war.  
By the time the first enemy combatant cases reached the Court in 
2004, however, the detentions at Guantanamo were temporally and 
physically removed from the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the Bush 
Administration’s unilateralism seemed arrogant and overly-aggressive, 
and the specter of a secret prison outside the law seemed incongruent 
with a constitutional republic. The fact that, as Goldsmith 
documents, so many (non-”radical”) groups came to support, via 
amicus briefs, the detainees’ claim to judicial review of their detention 
55. Tom Wilner and his colleagues at the D.C. law office of Shearman and 
Sterling also risked their professional reputations in courageously 
deciding to represent the families of a number of Kuwaiti detainees and 
in filing habeas corpus petitions in early 2002. 
56. Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s Cheney and Rumsfeld 
Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A6 (quoting Dick Cheney and 
Donald Rumsfeld). 
57. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 164.  
58. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481, 484 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008).  
59. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
60. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476; id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also 
Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intraterritorial Constitution, 62 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 369, 381–84 (2007) (discussing the legal 
status of Guantanamo Bay). 
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in Rasul—groups such as retired generals, diplomats and judges, 
former prisoners-of-war, hundreds of UK Parliamentarians, a 
collection of JAG officers, an impressive array of domestic and 
international human rights organizations, and the iconic Fred 
Korematsu himself—suggests how dramatically lawless the 
administration’s position seemed to be.61 The Court’s seemingly 
minimalist response in Rasul to grant detainees statutory habeas 
rights, packed great symbolic force, by pulling the executive in line 
with basic, American legal values. As Goldsmith describes, “[t]he 
presidency was untrustworthy, out of control, and defying the rule of 
law and military tradition.”62  
But this is just a pit stop in the course of the legal drama 
Goldsmith narrates. In short, the victories in Rasul, Hamdi, and later 
Hamdan, were supported by and further energized a massive network 
of coordinated human rights activists (foreign and domestic), 
journalists, military lawyers, and the private bar, to press for 
meaningful rights for detainees. Of particular note is the so-called 
Guantanamo Bar Association, made up of thousands of pro bono 
attorneys from the biggest and smallest law firms, the legal academy, 
public interest organizations, and federal public defender offices, 
which took on individual representation of hundreds of detainees and 
transformed Ratner’s “radical” litigation into a decidedly mainstream 
one, at the heart of the rule of law.63 Their coordinated efforts were 
enough to expose monumental human suffering,64 unfairness, and 
bureaucratic incompetence,65 wrestle freedom for hundreds of 
detainees (through pressure and advocacy, not through any court 
order),66 to overcome congressional efforts to restrict habeas rights via 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions 
61. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 170–75 (discussing Fred Korematsu 
and the other amici who filed briefs in the enemy combatant cases). 
62. Id. at 177.  
63. See Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz, Introduction, in THE 
GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 1–6 (Mark 
P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009) (describing generally the 
formation of the Guantánamo Bar Association and its purpose). 
64. See Guantánamo: A Life Sentence of Suffering and Stigmatization, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/feature-stories/guantanamo-a-life-sentence-of-suffering-and-
stigmatization-20060203.  
65. See P. Sabin Willett, Who’s at Guantánamo Anyway?, in THE 
GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 
63, at 7–8 (describing various examples of bureaucratic incompetence). 
66. See Guantánamo Bay Naval Base (Cuba), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/national/usstatesterritoriesandposs
essions/guantanamobaynavalbasecuba/index.html.  
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Act of 2006,67 and to ultimately secure a constitutional right to 
habeas corpus grounded in the Suspension Clause in 2008 in 
Boumediene v. Bush.68  
The year 2008 was a heady one for the Guantanamo Bar 
Association. Following the Boumediene decision, lawyers were having 
considerable success in litigating their habeas petitions in the district 
courts: district courts were imposing some substantive law-of-war-
based limitations on a previously unconstrained executive detention 
authority; they were carefully identifying and dismissing evidence 
procured by torture; and they were rejecting evidence based on 
hearsay or other attenuated evidentiary principles advanced by the 
Bush Administration.69 President Obama’s election promised the 
eventual closure of the facility.70 These seemed to represent a twin 
victory for the rule of law and a dramatic vindication of CCR’s 
decision to bring these challenges six years earlier.  
Instead, in Goldsmith’s telling, this decision produced unintended 
and paradoxical consequences. Obama abandoned his promise, made 
on the first day in office, to close Guantanamo within one year and to 
try 9/11 conspirators in an Article III court, and his administration 
aggressively defended a broad detention authority and the validity of 
every single detention decision made by the prior administration in 
the habeas cases percolating in the D.C. federal courts.71 At the same 
time, the highly conservative D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
had been thrice reversed by the Supreme Court for ratifying the 
executive branch’s position in detainee cases (Rasul, Hamdan, 
Boumediene), kicked into action, steadily reversing every single 
habeas grant by a district court (at the same time it affirmed nearly 
every habeas denial).72 Far from a model of accountability, the D.C. 
Circuit is acting in fairly open defiance of the Supreme Court’s 
Boumediene decision, mocking Boumediene’s “airy suppositions,” 
reversing factual findings traditionally reserved for district courts, 
offering the executive branch enormously expansive detention 
authority under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) and the laws of war (even hinting at the inapplicability of 
67. See Denebeaux & Hafetz, supra note 63, at 3 (noting congressional 
attempts to eliminate the writ). 
68. See Mark C. Fleming, Boumediene v. Bush: The Death Knell for 
Prisons Beyond the Law, in THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A 
PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 63, at 219. 
69. See Baher Azmy, A Return to the Writ: Executive Detention, 
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
445, 531–33 (2009). 
70. See Denbeaux & Hafetz, supra note 63, at 4. 
71. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 190–94. 
72. See Azmy, supra note 69, at 512.   
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any international law constraints on executive conduct) and simply 
ratifying every executive detention decision, no matter how 
attenuated or contemptible.73 Despite Boumediene’s judgment, we 
find ourselves still in a pre-Boumediene world where, as Judge Tatel 
described, “the court calls the game in the government’s favor.”74  
CCR President Michael Ratner believes the campaign that started 
in 2002 led to many victorious battles, including “getting six or seven 
hundred men out of Guantanamo” and “tak[ing] on . . . the most 
egregious aspects of . . . the national security state since 9/11, and 
mak[ing] them public debating issues.”75 But Ratner regrets that he 
“lost” on some basic questions like “the enemy combatant issue . . . 
the preventive detention issue . . . and the military commission issue, 
more or less.”76 
Goldsmith does not find this aspect of the litigation disappointing 
as I do and as Ratner does, just ironic (and in a good way);77 what 
started as a “radical” challenge to military paradigm of indefinite 
preventive detention ended up actually “legitimating” this system, via 
“consensus legal infrastructure.” All three branches of government 
(and the public) have accepted, ten years hence, the language and 
logic of a wartime approach to counterterrorism. Indeed, the 
detention cases themselves have broad reaching effects: they provided 
a corpus of law regarding who is detainable under the AUMF78 that 
grounded the administration’s targeting decisions in some semblance 
of law. Goldsmith concludes his deterministic historical analysis as 
follows:  
[F]or those who believe that the terrorist threat remains real 
and scary, and that the nation needs a Commander in Chief 
empowered to meet the threat in unusual ways—embedding the 
presidential prerogatives in the rule of law is an enormous 
73. See id. at 512–14. 
74. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting). 
75. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 195. 
76. Id. 
77. Which is nothing to say of the dramatic successes of the litigation—
reuniting hundreds of detainees with their families, organizing the bar 
and the public to recognize the unlawful arrogation of power by the 
president and his military officials, changing the dishonest narrative 
about the supposed dangerousness of these detainees, and exposing 
torture and incompetence in the basic administration of U.S. detention 
policy. 
78. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).  
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blessing. It is a blessing, ironically, for which the nation has 
Michael Ratner and his colleagues to thank.79 
This observation, though somewhat true and somewhat tart, does 
not to my mind fully capture the complexity, instability, or fairness of 
the post-9/11 legal landscape. Having attempted to suggest the ways 
in which the component parts of Goldsmith’s synopticon (journalists, 
watchdogs, lawyers, and courts) may not be as piercing as he believes, 
I now offer a slightly deeper critique.  
III. An Unstable Theory of Legitimacy 
Goldsmith’s normative analysis—that the current national 
security landscape is objectively “legitimate”—is built on a shaky 
foundation. His methodological basis for arriving at this judgment 
leads to premature or ill-founded conclusions. While Goldsmith and I 
can agree that the presidency has been made accountable in some 
ways, we should recognize the numerous other ways in which it 
remains deeply unaccountable. I fear it is not just Goldsmith’s 
admirable optimism about American institutions, but perhaps also his 
investiture and defense of our now sprawling national security 
apparatus, which causes him to unfairly privilege one form of 
accountability over other, more consequential forms.  
Goldsmith believes the work of human rights NGOs and other 
pieces of his accountability synopticon have left “no doubt that 
[current detention and targeting] practices are lawful and legitimate 
within the American constitutional system.”80 He believes we have 
reached an equilibrium of power and constraint whose “legitimacy” 
should make us pleased with the present state of affairs. Much of this 
is unexplained, though he does state in the penultimate chapter: 
[A]mong politicians, judges, and most of the American people, 
there is agreement on the legitimacy of and basic constraints on 
these [detention, targeting and military commission] powers, 
especially compared to the 2001–2004 baseline. This 
equilibrium—and the legal and political settlement that 
undergirds it—is the main reason Obama continued so many 
Bush counterterrorism policies as they stood in 2009. The same 
legal and political pressures that influenced the evolution of 
Bush’s policies continued to influence the development of 
Obama’s policies, though in different ways.81 
79. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 196. 
80. Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
81. Id. at 210.  
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Thus, it appears the legitimation of the current legal landscape 
has three primary sources: (1) the Obama Administration’s continued 
use of Bush Administration policies; (2) public support; and (3) 
judicial ratification.  
Before proceeding to contest each component of his legitimacy 
matrix, I pause to note a deep conceptual flaw shared by all of them: 
an “is-ought” conflation appears particularly prominently in this part 
of Goldsmith’s analysis. Goldsmith’s theory of legitimacy has a law 
and economics feel to it; it operates as a variation of an efficient 
market hypothesis. Under his view, it appears, we have reached a 
present and optimal state of social-political-legal affairs because a set 
of efficient (yet invisible) inputs, information, and dynamic 
relationships pushed us inevitably to this point. The price is right. 
But this sort of self-fulfilling determinism cannot be taken at face 
value—one must always identify a credible dynamic that could 
produce an efficient or legitimate outcome. In a fully competitive 
market, it is the price mechanism which produces efficiency and 
legitimacy, by transparently matching buyers and sellers at an 
optimal intersection of supply and demand. Where is the parallel 
mechanism driving the U.S. national security policy to a legitimate 
place? That is left largely unexplored.  
I have already tried to identify how a number of the inputs 
(checks) are likely not as robust as Goldsmith believes and that, 
therefore, may not be pushing us to the efficient (legitimate) 
equilibrium of power versus constraint. I now briefly address each of 
the three principle bases upon which Goldsmith believes the current 
landscape is based in order to demonstrate they cannot plausibly 
support a normative claim of legitimacy. 
A. The Obama Administration  
Goldsmith is right, of course, that the Obama Administration, 
while affirming the rejection of some of the grossest excesses of first 
Bush Administration policy (torture, secret CIA prisons, 
extraordinary rendition to torture, most of which were actually 
abandoned prior to 200982) has maintained central features of the 
Bush Administration’s detention, trial, and targeting practices as well 
as its analytical foundation. Goldsmith posits that one reason these 
controversial policies have continued—despite Obama’s withering 
criticism of them as a candidate—is that they have been repeatedly 
vetted, analyzed, and ultimately accepted by lawyers within the 
administration.83 This may be true; but, there is just no way to be 
82. We cannot actually confirm that none of these practices have continued 
in any form. If it turns out not to be true, we would have to conclude 
the synopticon is not working according to plan.  
83. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 38. 
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sure. In this political environment it seems risky to ascribe some 
underlying correctness to Obama’s policies; that is, to assume he is 
following them because he genuinely believes they are the right or 
legal thing to do. This account does not sufficiently account for 
politics or contingencies.  
As for closing Guantanamo, trying detainees in Article III courts, 
and releasing many others, principle seems to have little to do with it. 
Grandstanding NIMBY politicians (in both Democratic and 
Republican administrations) rejected and sensationalized Obama’s 
attempt to relocate concededly innocent Uigher detainees in northern 
Virginia.84 Had Americans seen these men, living among them in 
peace, holding down jobs (and criticizing the Chinese Communist 
government85), we could have recast the entire debate about the 
supposed lethality of detainees in Guantanamo. Instead, some have 
been disbursed to Bermuda, Palau, El Salvador, and others, equally 
innocent, sit out their eleventh year there.86 The same holds true for 
the bizarre, fright-filled reaction to Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
proposal to try 9/11 conspirators in the Southern District of New 
York, the safest courthouse in the country.87 As with the failure to 
relocate and humanize numerous harmless detainees, the decision to 
try 9/11 conspirators in military commissions instead of real courts is 
attributable to politics, not law.  
Why didn’t Obama do more to press his earlier principles? 
Goldsmith presumably believes the University of Chicago 
constitutional law professor was persuaded on the merits to abandon 
them. But likely he simply had other priorities, including mustering 
political attention and support for massive health care legislation and 
a sustained response to financial catastrophe. If one believes Daniel 
Klaidman’s account in Kill or Capture, the politicos in the Obama 
84. See Amy Gardner, Candidates Cautious or Concerned About Possible 
Relocation of Detainees to Va., WASH. POST, May 15, 2009, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/14/AR200 
9051404098.html.  
85. See Peter Spiegel & Barbara Demick, Uighur Detainees at Guantanamo 
Pose a Problem for Obama, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, http://articles 
.latimes.com/2009/feb/18/world/fg-uighurs-gitmo18 (noting the 
difficulty of dealing with Uighur ethnic minorities who wish to gain 
independence from China). 
86. Jake Tapper, First Gitmo Detainees in More Than a Year Transferred; 
Uighur Detainees Bound for El Salvador, ABC (Apr. 20, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/first-gitmo-detainees-in-
more-than-a-year-transferred/. 
87. See Carrie Johnson, For Holder, Much Wrestling Over Decision, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 14, 2009, at A01 (noting the U.S. Marshals Service’s 
determination that the Southern District of New York is the safest 
courthouse in the country).  
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Administration such as Rahm Emmanuel and David Axelrod, believed 
it would be political suicide to press ahead with plans to persuade the 
public to close Guantanamo, screamed down the voices of conscience 
in the administration, including White House Counsel Greg Craig who 
left in defeat, and ultimately prevailed on a deeply ambivalent 
president.88 All of this suggests that the merits of legal principle were 
not necessarily at play in these judgments; if this much is true, then it 
would seem possible that Obama could shift course in his second term 
to secure a legacy consistent with his original human rights and 
constitutional law instincts and thus destabilize the regime Goldsmith 
believes currently to be legitimate.  
Or, take another example: Why did Obama choose not to 
prosecute CIA officials responsible for torture and homicide? Perhaps 
he felt they had sufficient legal authority to act, or that the public 
would not support selling out his predecessors. Jane Mayer suggests a 
far less principled reason. According to one of her high-level 
administration sources, Obama was told in no uncertain terms that 
the worst thing an inexperienced (and especially Democratic) 
president could ever do in the beginning of his term is turn against 
the CIA; the agency would, in turn, undermine him thoroughly.89 The 
fear of losing the CIA must also explain the Obama Administration’s 
decision to re-assert a full-throated state secrets defense in the 
Mohamed v. Jeppeson90 torture and extraordinary rendition case in 
the Ninth Circuit, one month into office, despite the clearest 
indications that he would abandon this beloved CIA defense.91 Again, 
fear, not principled study of the law, appears to be driving much of 
the power-constraint equilibrium.92  
Alternatively (or in addition), Obama’s decision to abandon his 
prior commitments may have to do with the very imperial vortex of 
the office of the presidency and the echo chamber of national security 
obsession in which it must operate. Consider Woodrow Wilson. Like 
Obama, he was a progressive constitutional law scholar before 
88. See generally DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE (2012). 
89. See Jane Mayer, Ask Jane Mayer Anything: Should Bush Officials Be 
Tried For War Crimes?, THE DAILY BEAST (July 23, 2012), 
http://andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com/2012/07/ask-jane-mayer-
anything-should-the-bush-administration-be-tried-for-war-crimes.html. 
90. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
91. Id. at 1083–84  
92. A fear that the CIA will go rogue has permeated virtually every 
presidential administration since Eisenhower. See WEINER, supra note 3. 
The nearly sovereign status of this secret agency, destabilizing as it can 
be to any president’s foreign policy, surely demands more scrutiny and 
accountability than currently exists.  
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assuming the office of the president.93 As president and professor at 
Princeton University, Wilson wrote eloquently and thoughtfully about 
the importance of robust First Amendment protections for dissident 
viewpoints.94 Yet, when he became president, he presided over the 
passage of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, 
and the criminal prosecution of dozens of peaceful war objectors and 
dissidents who he blithely considered destabilizing enemies of the 
state, producing one of the most repressive periods in American 
history.95 His dramatic change of course was likely not due to a 
principled or legitimate change of legal heart, and his policies were 
ratified by his Attorney General, Congress, and the courts (including, 
until it changed course, the Supreme Court). Under Goldsmith’s 
analysis, therefore, this multi-year and repressive stasis, even though 
ultimately discredited, would have maintained legal legitimacy. 
B. Public Opinion 
It is always fraught to consider public opinion as a measure of the 
normative legitimacy of a complex legal or policy question. What do 
Americans make of Planned Parenthood v. Casey?96 Or our 
jurisprudential compromises around the death penalty? Public opinion 
is notoriously fickle and often based on vague impressions or the 
framing of polling questions rather than on objective evidence. 
Consistent polling actually suggests a majority of Americans are 
uncomfortable with the more far-reaching provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.97 Much of the backlash against transferring individuals to the 
United States or trying individuals here (or even transferring cleared 
detainees to their home countries) is ultimately based on the most 
fatuous and cynical political posturing by Congress that it is difficult 
for polling to reflect. Still, Goldsmith is surely right in his gestalt 
judgment that there is no widespread disapproval of Obama’s 
detention and targeting policies, and none approaching the 
disapprobation of Bush Administration practices, tied up as they  
were with impressions of venality (Cheney-Rumsfeld-Yoo) and 
incompetence (Iraq, Katrina).  
93. See Jill Lepore, A Good Bad Guy, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/10/10/hating-woodrow-
wilson/why-woodrow-wilson-makes-a-good-bad-guy. 
94. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 145–46 (2004). 
95. See id. at 135–60. 
96. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
97. See Steve Chapman, The Candidates vs. the Bill of Rights, TOWNHALL 
(Aug. 23, 2012), http://townhall.com/columnists/stevechapman/2012 
/08/23/the_candidates_vs_the_bill_of_rights/page/full/ (suggesting 
that Americans do not always favor complete religious freedom or the 
full scope of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
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But where does this gestalt judgment get us? It does not follow 
that people have consciously accepted the legality of Obama’s 
practices. Apathy and disinterest seem the norm. The economy is a 
mess, and people have already been talking about Guantanamo for 
ten years. The managing attorney of CCR’s Guantanamo docket 
recounts being asked, in 2010, by an otherwise educated and well-
informed individual, “But, I thought Obama already closed 
Guantanamo?” Apathy, more than acceptance, is the norm. 
Goldsmith identifies another dynamic at work: a reverse Nixon-
goes-to-China. If Obama, burdened with the expectations that 
Democrats are soft on national security, plays against this type and 
keeps open the prison and assassinates multiple people he says are 
part of enemy forces, people will more likely trust this decision as 
deliberative and based on legitimate concerns. This suggests public 
approval is just a vague, impressionistic presumption, and not an 
informed or meaningful reflection of what the state of the law ought 
to be.98  
More importantly, even if there were widespread approval, what 
would that mean for our system of legitimacy? Presumably there was 
widespread approval for the FDR’s decision to intern Japanese and 
the Court’s ratification of that decision under the Constitution—a 
then-legitimate state of affairs that we shudder to think about today.  
C. The Courts 
1. Detention 
Goldsmith emphasizes the Supreme Court’s interventions in 
Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and ultimately Boumediene, both cabined the 
excesses of early Bush Administration policies (torture, secret prisons, 
incommunicado detention, deliberate evasion of the courts) and 
solidified the current legal equilibrium: the same decisions, by 
ratifying policies regarding preventive detention and targeting, 
contributed to their current legitimacy. Goldsmith is particularly fond 
of the legitimacy paradox as articulated by Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
in Boumediene, that judicial review does not weaken the presidency, 
98. Probably very few of the public know that nearly half of the current 
detainees in Guantanamo have been “cleared for release” by a 
comprehensive Inter-Agency Task Force, and that therefore, all relevant 
national security agencies have concluded that they aren’t dangerous 
and should no longer be detained. I should think if the public did know 
this troubling state of affairs, they would be far less likely to think our 
current detention practices are legitimate. And, if the public still did 
think accept this as fair, public opinion should not be given much 
weight in an analysis of a policy’s legitimacy.  
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it strengthens it: According to Kennedy, “the exercise of those powers 
is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.”99  
As a general matter, it is hard to see how Goldsmith can so easily 
accept the idea that judicial intervention provides a legitimating role 
in light of the public disapproval of judicial decisions such as Brown 
v. Board of Education100 (in the South), Roe v. Wade,101 or Kelo v. 
New London.102 More specifically, Goldsmith’s account suffers here 
from the is-ought conflation: an assumption that the level of judicial 
intervention as it is today, constitutes proof that it should be this 
way. There are strong reasons to question whether we have arrived at 
an equilibrium and that the present state of judicial review of 
detention and interrogation operations is insufficiently robust and 
legitimate.  
As an initial matter, Goldsmith’s deterministic view of the present 
state of judicial review, and its attendant legitimacy, appears 
insufficiently appreciative of pure fortuity. For example, the account 
proceeds largely as if the Supreme Court’s intervention in Boumediene 
(and Kennedy’s statement about the judicial ratification of executive 
power) was inevitable. Far from it. Recall that the Supreme Court 
actually denied the Boumediene and Al-Odah cert petitions in 2007,103 
leaving Guantanamo detainees and the executive branch under the 
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)-Military Commissions Act regime 
ratified by the D.C. Circuit, without any habeas review of the legality 
of their detentions. Under that DTA-based judicial-review regime, the 
Suspension Clause did not apply to Guantanamo, and the only 
inquiry left for the judiciary was the preposterously narrow one of 
whether the military in fact followed its own procedures in 
implementing the administrative Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
(CSRT) proceedings. There would be no opportunity to offer 
independent evidence of innocence, to challenge scope of detention 
authority, or to even demand release in the unlikely event a detainee 
prevailed under this DTA construct. Presumably, had the Supreme 
Court not granted the petitioners’ motion to reconsider its earlier cert 
denial—a contingency so remote we easily forget it happened—
Goldsmith would still endorse the D.C. Circuit’s limited DTA-based 
judicial review scheme, as a fair and legitimate balance of executive 
power and (limited) judicial constraint on that power. 
99. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 194 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723, 797 (2008)). 
100. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
101. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
102. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
103. See Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328 (2007).  
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Instead, petitioners’ counsel, through a series of high-wire 
coincidences, located Stephen Abraham, a California lawyer and 
former Naval Intelligence officer who had been involved in a number 
of CSRT panels, and who was willing to blow the whistle at that 
moment in time, via declaration to the Court and congressional 
testimony about how laughably one-sided and outcome-determinative 
the CSRT process was.104 It was proof that the kind of broad 
deference to the CSRT process endorsed by the D.C. Circuit could 
not operate as an adequate substitute to even the most elementary 
requirements of habeas corpus and must have convinced the Supreme 
Court that it need not wait to see how the D.C. Circuit regime shook 
out. The system Goldsmith imagines generally works rationally and 
predictably to produce democratically accountable and legitimate 
outcomes. So, what if the Boumediene and Al-Odah petitioners’ 
counsel had never been able to find Stephen Abraham’s silver bullet 
in time to file a motion to reconsider with the Court? Presumably, 
Goldsmith would still consider the alternate, weaker system to 
represent the best of all possible worlds.  
But, we did get Boumediene and an order from the High Court 
that each detainee be provided a “meaningful” opportunity to 
challenge the legal and factual basis of their detention, without any of 
the presumptive deference Congress and the D.C. Circuit sought to 
give the military’s CSRT determinations regarding detainability.105 It 
was a result the Guantanamo Bar Association cheered at the time, as 
a capstone of a long, hard struggle for genuine accountability in 
Guantanamo. As I’ve written elsewhere,106 Boumediene in fact 
produced accountability in the district courts, as those habeas courts 
were finally empowered to, among other things, including limit the 
president’s otherwise utterly unconstrained AUMF and law-of-war 
detention authority, throw out government evidence that was 
procured by torture and coercion, and carefully scrutinize the 
plausibility of otherwise highly attenuated guilt-by-association 
theories proposed by the government. In the early months following 
Boumediene, and consistent with what the Guantanamo Bar had long 
argued was the unfairness of so many of the Guantanamo detentions, 
detainees were successful in a significant majority of their habeas 
petitions in the district courts.107  
104. See Gitmo Panelist Slams Hearing Process, CBS (Feb. 11, 2009), htt 
p://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-2970288-2.html?pageNum=1. 
105. See Boumediene v. Bush, 552 U.S. 723, 779–81 (2008).  
106. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 69. 
107. See Linda Greenhouse, Goodbye to Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2012), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/goodbye-to-gitmo 
(stating that during the first two years after Boumediene, district courts 
granted habeas corpus in nineteen out of thirty-four cases) 
49 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012  
An Insufficiently Accountable Presidency 
Goldsmith’s is one version of a legitimate and accountable 
separation-of-powers regime, which preserves a meaningful role for the 
courts in a manner consistent with Boumediene’s instructions and the 
historic scope of the great writ. But, importantly it is decidedly not 
the one we have now. Sitting in open defiance of the Supreme Court’s 
Boumediene decision, the D.C. Circuit has eviscerated the prospect of 
meaningful judicial scrutiny by the district courts of the president’s 
detention decisions. The D.C. Circuit has reversed every district court 
decision granting the writ and affirmed nearly every decision denying 
the writ. The D.C. Circuit has purposefully ensured that the president 
has complete discretion to detain, via decisions that: (1) reverse 
careful fact-finding of the district courts, in favor of its own 
assessments of credibility and plausibility of evidence;108 (2) accept the 
facial validity of government evidence, no matter how dated, raw, or 
contestable;109 (3) reject the relevance of international law to interpret 
detention authority, in a manner contravening the Supreme Court’s 
plurality opinion in Hamdi;110 and (4) prohibit district courts from 
entering orders requiring the executive to release non-detainable 
petitioners, preferring supine orders that merely encourage the 
executive to undertake its best efforts to find a detainee a home.111 As 
Judge Tatel observed in his dissent in Latif, the D.C. Circuit’s 
jurisprudence comes perilously close to accepting what the 
government says as true.112 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has effectively 
reinstated its 2007 Boumediene/Al-Odah jurisprudence of categorical 
deference; now in 2012, it is as if Boumediene had never been decided. 
And, if the Court’s decision in Boumediene was necessary to preserve 
legitimacy of our system, what does Goldsmith make of the fact that 
the D.C. Circuit has since effectively overruled it?  
In sum, for Guantanamo detentions, the writ no longer exists as a 
mechanism of accountability. It is impossible then, to agree with 
Goldsmith’s belief that the current state of judicial constraint on 
executive detention power is optimal.  
2. Targeting  
Lessons about the judiciary’s role in reviewing targeting decisions 
are equally inconclusive. In 2010, CCR and the ACLU sought an 
injunction to prevent the extrajudicial killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, a 
108. See generally Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (2010) (overturning a 
district court’s factual finding that detainee was not a member of al-
Qaeda). 
109. See Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748–49 (2011). 
110. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (2010). 
111. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (2009). 
112. See Latif, 666 F.3d at 779 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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U.S. citizen residing in Yemen (i.e., far from a zone of actual armed 
conflict), after it was reported that al-Aulaqi had been placed on an 
executive “kill list.”113 District Court Judge John Bates took the 
questions raised by the suit seriously, but ultimately dismissed the 
case on the grounds that the plaintiff, Anwar al-Aulaqi’s father, 
lacked standing to proceed on behalf of his son and that, in any event, 
the decision to target an individual for killing whom the president 
himself believes is an enemy is constitutionally committed to the 
executive branch under the political question doctrine.114 CCR and 
the ACLU have since filed another suit, challenging the legality of the 
eventual killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, plus the killings of U.S. citizen 
Samir Khan (whose killing was “collateral” to the targeted killing of 
al-Aulaqi) and Abdul-Rahman al-Aulaqi, the sixteen-year-old U.S. 
citizen-son of Anwar al-Aulaqi, who was killed in a massive drone 
strike two weeks later, without legitimate lawful or factual basis.115  
Goldsmith no doubt predicts that this latest suit will be dismissed 
on the political question doctrine, or Bivens special factors,116 or 
perhaps qualified immunity. He may be right, especially considering 
the overly-deferential state of D.C. Circuit law in the national 
security context. Dismissal on any one of these technical doctrines of 
judicial restraint, however, would not legitimate the legality of the 
decision to kill individuals without due process, any more than a 
court’s dismissal of murder charges under a statute of limitations 
would legitimate the underlying crime. The process of legitimation is 
dynamic and cannot be fixed with any one judicial determination. 
And, as Goldsmith rightly appreciates, this lawsuit is but one piece of 
advocacy and pressure by the “international legal-media-academic-
NGO-international organization-global opinion complex,” to 
“stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them.”117 
D. A Revealing Bias 
I have already suggested that Goldsmith tends toward the 
optimistic in his assessment of the legitimacy of the present legal-
political landscape and that it is hard to otherwise credit his 
confidence that the current state of the world is an optimal one. My 
skepticism of Goldsmith’s position is compounded considerably by a 
113. See CCR and the ACLU v. OFAC & Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, CTR. FOR 
CONST. RTS., http://www.ccrjustice.org/Al-Aulaqi-v-Obama+ (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
114. See id.  
115. Complaint, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-cv-01192 (D.D.C. July 18, 
2012), available at http://ccrjustice.org/targetedkillings. 
116. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 
Investigaton, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).  
117. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 200 (quoting Professor Kenneth Anderson).  
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persistent and serious factual error in his analysis that reveals an 
unjustified bias in favor of the status quo. 
Goldsmith credulously labels the detainees remaining in 
Guantanamo (numbering 166 by this writing) as “terrorist soldiers,” 
when the overwhelming majority are neither terrorists nor soldiers.118 
He also speculates without citation to authority that the remaining 
detainees are by now truly the “worst of the worst” that Rumsfeld 
falsely assured us were housed in Guantanamo in 2002. This is flatly 
incorrect. For example, at the time of the book’s publication, four 
remaining detainees were Uighers, who the Bush Administration and 
the courts concluded were not terrorists or soldiers or otherwise 
detainable.119 Indeed, by this writing 86 of the 166 detainees—i.e., 
over half of the remaining population—have been “cleared for 
transfer” by a rigorous inter-agency task force set up by the Obama 
Administration in his first year in office; this designation means that 
the relevant agencies (State Department, DHS, CIA, DOD, NSA, and 
NIA) have unanimously concluded that a detainee is not a threat to 
the United States or its allies and thus should be transferred to their 
home countries or resettled in a third country.120 These 86 men are 
decidedly not the worst of the worst; they remain in Guantanamo, 
despite the jailers’ determination that they should go free, only 
because of political timidity by the Obama Administration and 
substantively unjust restrictions on transferring detainees out of 
Guantanamo imposed by a craven Congress—restrictions that keep 
Guantanamo open and unaccountable, and we should hasten to add, 
Congress never saw fit to impose on the Bush Administration.  
This is more than a small oversight. It is revealing of Goldsmith’s 
predispositions. It is much easier to defend the status quo if one 
ignores its unambiguous injustices. By simply guessing that those who 
remain must be the really dangerous, Goldsmith reveals that he 
believes the system (including the process that has sorted who could 
go home and who must remain) works rationally and moves linearly 
toward progress. In fact, the system governing the Guantanamo 
118. See Guantánamo by the Numbers, supra note 7 (showing that a majority 
of the detainees remaining in Guantanamo have been cleared for 
release). 
119. See Two Uighurs Get a Fresh Start in El Salvador, WASH. POST, Apr. 
26, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/two-uighurs-get-a-
fresh-start-in-el-salvador/2012/04/26/gIQA9oI0jT_story.html.  
120. Obama Releases Names of Cleared Guantánamo Prisoners; Now It’s 
Time to Set Them Free, ANDY WORTHINGTON (Sept. 9, 2012), 
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2012/09/29/obama-releases-names-
of-cleared-guantanamo-prisoners-now-its-time-to-set-them-free/ (stating 
that eighty-six Guantanamo prisoners have been cleared for release by 
Obama’s Guantanamo Review Task Force); Guantánamo by the 
Numbers, supra note 7.  
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detentions, ten years into its creation, is astonishingly arbitrary, cruel 
and, ultimately, substantively illegitimate.  
IV. A Thin Theory of Accountability 
So far, I have addressed the claim that each component of 
Goldsmith’s synopticon can keep meaningful watch on the executive’s 
national security practices and the corollary that the surveillance and 
pressure of these inputs have produced a set of policies (e.g., 
detention, military commissions, and targeting) that are stable and 
endorsed as legitimate by the public and constitutional agents (the 
president, Congress, the courts). I now wish to briefly address 
Goldsmith’s ultimate claim that the president is and will remain 
sufficiently accountable to the American people, courts, and Congress, 
even as we proceed through an era of indefinite war. Goldsmith 
concedes that the mechanisms of accountability he identifies are quite 
different than those contemplated by James Madison to do the 
checking and balancing in our constitutional system, especially since 
Madison would no doubt be quite alarmed by the size and 
adventurousness of our modern, military presidency. Still, Goldsmith 
concludes: 
[A]fter adjusting to the modern world and studying the vitriolic 
clashes of the last decade between the presidency and its 
synopticon, Madison would discover a harmonious system of 
mutual frustration undergirding a surprising national 
consensus—a consensus always fruitfully under pressure from 
various quarters—about the proper scope of the President’s 
counter-terrorism authorities. And, then the father of the 
Constitution would smile.121 
That James Madison would, or anyone else should, accept the 
system of accountability Goldsmith describes, seems overly optimistic. 
Or, more to the point, enthusiasm for it depends on adopting in the 
first instance, a standard of accountability insufficiently rigorous for a 
healthy constitutional republic.  
A. Defining Accountability Down 
Toward the end of his book, Goldsmith offers his definition of 
accountability: “to be subject to an account, which in turn means to 
disclose one’s activities, explain and answer for them, and subject 
oneself to the consequences of the institution to which one is 
accounting.”122 As Goldsmith concedes, his definition need not include 
other traditional forms of accountability for wrongdoing such as 
121. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 243.  
122. Id. at 234–35. 
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criminal liability or, as I will discuss later, civil liability. This is 
accountability as process, rather than as substance. It credits a 
government entity’s disclosure of information for assessment by 
political actors (especially where the disclosure imposes administrative 
oversight burdens), even if no negative consequences attend to those 
who undertook unlawful activity. It is hard to see how mere 
investigations will ever provide adequate deterrence. I believe a 
legitimate system of separation of powers must insist on a higher 
standard of accountability. 
Recall that Goldsmith was satisfied that two of the architects of 
the CIA’s torture practices, former DOJ Office of Legal Counsel 
officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee, were subject to an intensive ethics 
investigation by the Department of Justice into their outcome-
determinative, executive-take-all legal opinions, even though higher-
level DOJ officials nixed the prospect of any legal sanction against the 
lawyers.123 The mere fact of an ethics investigation did not add much 
to the existing consensus in the legal and political establishment 
about Yoo and Bybee’s unethical lawyering. In light of that, the 
decision to overturn the DOJ’s recommendation of sanction looks 
little like accountability and more like the kind of impunity for high-
level officials one sees in a system that is not seriously committed to 
the rule of law. Goldsmith surmises that future national security 
lawyers will be more cautious in their work because of the “brutal 
recriminations that Jay Bybee, John Yoo, and other lawyers suffered 
as a result of legal opinions written at a time of scary threats.”124 Note 
Goldsmith’s allegiances: recriminations are “brutal,” but he says 
nothing of brutality of the interrogation techniques Yoo and Bybee 
authored. In any event, perhaps they take from this episode a very 
different lesson. After all, Yoo and Bybee, even after enduring this 
investigation, still now sit in the most elite positions of authority: 
tenured professor at University of California—Berkeley and judge on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
Goldsmith also credits the Durham investigation of CIA’s 
destruction of videotapes and of detainee homicides that occurred at 
the hands of the CIA, even though it resulted in no criminal 
prosecution or other public reprimand, because his investigation 
required the agency to turn over thousands of documents, churn 
through their memories, and explain their conduct; 125 this was both 
unprecedented in the annals of this secrecy-obsessed entity and a pain 
in their neck. This may have been better than nothing, or maybe it 
was not. The absence of punitive measures will potentially signal, over 
time, that these investigations are merely prophylactic and non-
123. See supra Section II.  
124. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 238. 
125. See id. at 236–39. 
54 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012  
An Insufficiently Accountable Presidency 
consequential. More problematic, endorsing this kind of paper review 
risks fundamentally corrupting judicial processes—it becomes a sort of 
show trial designed ultimately to justify policies under question, 
rather than a serious attempt to judge potential crimes on the merits.  
B. High-Level Impunity 
Goldsmith’s transparency-based system of political accountability 
should make it more difficult for executive-branch officials to repeat 
many of the same unlawful or extra-legal activities of the past. His 
metric of accountability is admirably forward looking. This 
perspective, however, overlooks another important component of a 
meaningful system of accountability: legal liability for unlawful 
conduct. One would think this kind of accountability, i.e., forcing 
actors to internalize the costs of their serious misconduct, would be a 
part of any “ecology of transparency,” but it is not for Goldsmith. 
Accordingly, while Goldsmith largely endorses Supreme Court cases 
such as Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene because they pushed 
the executive to be more transparent and responsive to coordinate 
branches of government, he pays no attention to a very troubling set 
of cases that have ensured impunity to numerous (mostly high-level) 
government officials for the most egregious of the Bush 
Administration practices—torture, extraordinary rendition, and 
religious discrimination. Given a widespread perception that Bush 
Administration policies were fundamentally lawless, the judiciary’s 
response to serious legal challenges seeking accountability (i.e., an 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing) against some of the administration’s 
most controversial practices represents a serious failure in our system.  
The architecture of impunity constructed by the courts for the 
benefit of government officials engaged in illegal conduct is especially 
concerning for several reasons:  
• The Supreme Court repeatedly rejected, the theoretical 
premise upon which many of these damages-
accountability detention cases were dismissed—that the 
judiciary is not competent to second guess executive 
decisions in wartime, or that executive officials should 
have near complete discretion to act in matters related 
to national security—and did so in a manner that itself 
marked a conscious departure from the Court’s 
regrettable World War II-era deference to the 
military.126 
 
126. See id. at 168–170 (discussing the “longlasting shame” of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States, 324 U.S. 885 (1945)). 
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• Under this country’s  Marbury paradigm, and even in 
the ever-diminishing Bivens context, the remedy of 
damages for government misconduct is (and should be) 
still considered an important attribute of our 
commitment to the rule of law and separation of 
powers.127  
• Sister nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom 
have provided substantial damages awards (aided by, if 
not directly compelled by, judicial decree) for their role 
in abuses of some of the very same people denied relief 
in U.S. courts.128  
Consider just a few examples of the judiciary’s failure to hold the 
executive branch accountable.  
1. Extraordinary Rendition 
In the extraordinary rendition context, the Second Circuit sitting 
en banc dismissed the infamous case of Maher Arar, a Canadian 
citizen who sued a variety of federal government officials under 
Bivens for their role in apprehending and abusing him in JFK Airport 
and in rendering him to Syria through a deliberate evasion of judicial 
process, where he was tortured as part of an allegedly joint Syrian-
U.S. interrogation plan.129 The Canadian government acknowledged 
Arar’s innocence, accepted responsibility for their role in his torture, 
apologized to him, and paid him $10 million—an act of meaningful 
accountability. The Second Circuit, however, concluded that a 
number of “special factors,” most general among them, the national 
security context in which the case arose, counseled hesitation in the 
127. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual 
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One 
of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”); Bivens 
v. Six Unkown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“The [government’s] arguments for a more stringent test to 
govern the grant of damages in constitutional cases [than that governing 
a grant of equitable relief] seem to be adequately answered by the point 
that the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the 
vindication of constitutional interests. . . .”).  
128. See, e.g., Philip Bentley, QC & David Henry, UK Competition Court 
Awards Punitive Damages for the First Time, MCDERMOTT, WILL & 
EMERY (July 9, 2012), http://www.mwe.com/UK-Competition-Court-
Awards-Punitive-Damages-For-the-First-Time-07-09-2012/?Publication 
Types=d9093adb-e95d-4f19-819a-f0bb5170ab6d (noting that UK law 
provides “exemplary damages” for instances of “oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional conduct by ‘servants of the government’”). 
129. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565–67 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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creation of a Bivens damage remedy for Arar.130 Most significant, the 
majority ultimately viewed Arar’s suit, though styled as an 
individual-damages action against high-level government officials, as a 
challenge to a long-standing executive policy of extraordinary 
rendition.131 This is a curious but revealing objection because these 
concerns would apply to any civil rights action—almost all of which 
use the damage remedy to affect “government interests” and, if 
moderately successful, “elicit government funds for settlement.”132 
And, that a civil rights action might influence the unlawful 
implementation of a government policy can hardly be a reason to 
“counsel hesitation” in its creation because, as Judge Sack 
understated, “that is their point.”133 Civil rights actions, as in any 
healthy tort system, are designed to “make it more costly for 
executive officers to violate the Constitution.”134 That a court is 
unwilling to constrain the executive’s ability to violate the 
constitution should be seen as a serious defect in a system of 
accountability.  
In El-Masri v. Tenet135 and Mohamed v. Jeppesen Data Plan,136 
the Fourth Circuit and en banc Ninth Circuit ruled that the state 
secrets doctrine required dismissal of rendition and torture claims on 
the pleadings, even after assuming that the plaintiffs could prove all 
facts necessary to prevail based on already-public information.137 Yet, 
each court’s concern about an unacceptable risk of disclosure of 
classified information appears at tension with the judiciary’s notable 
success in the detention context, of meeting and managing that same 
concern. In notable contrast,  the European Court of Human Rights 
found the Macedonian government acted unlawfully in conspiring 
with U.S. officials to effectuate El-Masri’s rendition, and ordered 
payment of damages to El-Masri,138  while the British government 
paid Mohamed and other British citizens millions of dollars in 
compensation for the British government’s role in the rendition, 
130. See id. at 573.  
131. See id. at 574 (“Such a suit unavoidably influences government policy, 
probes government secrets, invades government interests, enmeshes 
government lawyers, and thereby elicits government funds for 
settlement.”). 
132. Id.  
133. Id. at 602–03 (Sack, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)).  
135. 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2005). 
136. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
137. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 299–300; Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1073.  
138. El-Masri v. Macedonia, No. 39630-09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 12 
2012). 
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unlawful detention and torture at the hands of the Americans.139  
And, more problematic for Goldsmith’s theory, the decisions 
demonstrate that the judiciary is not particularly interested in forcing 
transparency among coordinate branches of government and thus is 
not advancing the limited theory of accountability Goldsmith 
proposes.  
2. Torture 
In the torture context, in Rasul v. Myers,140 the D.C. Circuit ruled 
that government officials allegedly responsible for the torture and 
abuse of Guantanamo detainees were entitled to qualified immunity 
because an alien’s constitutional right to be free from torture and 
abuse outside the territorial United States was not “clearly 
established,” and because military personnel alleged to have engaged 
in torture were acting “within the scope of their employment.”141 The 
per curium opinion all but stated that prisoner abuse is a routine and 
sometimes necessary part of warfare. This seems like a form of judicial 
approbation of extra-legal conduct, and not a form of judicially-
imposed accountability.142 Even Jose Padilla, who unlike Shafiq Rasul, 
was a U.S. citizen, brutally and systematically tortured for period of 
months on U.S. soil, would not be entitled to receive even one dollar 
in nominal damages from government officials, because the existence 
of “special factors,” such as potentially illegal policy decisions made 
by government actors, precluded the judiciary from second guessing 
such decisions. As appellate counsel for Mr. Padilla and a protagonist 
in Goldsmith’s book, Ben Wizner, wrote in the ACLU’s brief for Mr. 
Padilla, the Fourth Circuit’s decision takes this country to the bottom 
of the slippery slope.143 Goldsmith does not attempt to account for 
this remarkable abdication of the judicial role.  
139. See Patrick Wintour, Guantanamo Bay Detainees to be Paid 
Compensation by UK Government, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Nov. 15, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/16/guantanamo-bay-
compensation-claim. 
140. 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
141. Id. at 660.  
142. The court also ruled in some troubling logic that these foreign-national 
detainees were not a “person” within the statutory terms of the 
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act and as such could not pursue 
religious discrimination claims. See id. at 532–33. 
143. Brief for Appellant, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(No. 11-6480). 
Because ‘[n]o court had specifically and definitely addressed the 
rights of enemy combatants,’ the court held that Defendant’s 
were not on notice that subjecting Padilla to beatings; depriving 
him of sleep, heat and light; and threatening him with worse 
torture and death might violate the Constitution. By this 
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3. Supervisory Liability 
In the supervisory liability context, the Supreme Court in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal144 held that Attorney General John Ashcroft and 
FBI Director Robert Mueller were entitled to qualified immunity from 
a Bivens damages suit.145 The Court concluded that the plaintiff’s 
allegations that the officials acted with the required discriminatory 
animus in creating a special hold policy for Muslim detainees were 
“implausible,” particularly in light of an “obvious alternative” 
explanation of valid law enforcement goals in pursuing suspected 
terrorists following the calamity of 9/11.146 The Court’s conclusion 
that bias was implausible in light of a neutral wartime explanation 
creeps suspiciously close to Justice Black’s implausible rejection of 
charges of racism as partially motivating Japanese internment.147 In 
any event, that kind of plausibility determination would typically be 
sent to a jury. But, by making the plausibility determination at the 
motion-to-dismiss threshold, the Supreme Court ensured that no jury 
in this case and others, exercise any hindsight bias and find, years 
after-the-fact, that these government officials acted unreasonably. 
Thus, the Court itself created a significant obstacle, to accountability 
through the judicial system for official wrongdoing.  
Though we cannot know for sure, it is fair to surmise that 
Goldsmith would view these cases as fitting in nicely in his 
accountability model, not least because his model appears to exclude 
the forms of accountability these cases seek. Goldsmith would likely 
say that these cases achieve the right results because the executive 
branch should have substantial discretion in creating policies in 
response to dangerous contingencies, without worrying about future 
liability at a point when public opinion has shifted. He would then 
likely suggest that the cases are nevertheless proof of the legitimacy of 
our accountability system (narrowly defined) because it forced the 
government to respond to the complaint, on the road to a judicial 
endorsement of Goldsmith’s normative view of broad executive power. 
extraordinary logic, Defendants could have beaten Padilla to 
death and faced no liability, because ‘not court’ had ‘specifically 
addressed’ the right of ‘enemy combatants’ to be free from 
extrajudicial murder. 
 Id. at 29. See also Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (dismissing a Bivens suit brought by a U.S. citizen against the 
former Defense Secretary for authorizing interrogation techniques that 
resulted in Vance’s torture while in U.S. custody in Iraq). 
144. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
145. Id. at 675–76.  
146. Id. at 675–76, 682. 
147. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 224, 223 (1944). 
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Despite what seems to me the manifest unfairness of these cases and 
this doctrine, Goldsmith would presumably still think we still live in 
the best of all possible national security worlds.  
C. The Tragedy of the American Form of Legitimacy  
What can explain the categorical failure of the accountability 
cases, at least from the perspective of individuals bringing them? 
Recall that one particular peculiarity of these cases is that the very 
theory of exclusive executive prerogative over detention and 
interrogation these cases heartily endorse, was rejected by the 
Supreme Court repeatedly in the enemy combatant cases. One 
possible explanation is that these accountability cases, like much of 
Goldsmith’s perspective, are grounded in a foundation of American 
exceptionalism. These accountability cases are quite hostile to and 
dismissive of the claims of the plaintiffs to wrest restitution from 
representatives of the U.S. government. Thus, for Goldsmith and the 
Supreme Court, it may be one (positive) thing for the judiciary to 
make the president accountable to another branch of the U.S. 
government; it is quite another (unacceptable) thing for the judiciary 
to make the president accountable to foreigners or, in Goldsmith’s 
shoddy but revealing parlance, “terrorist soldiers.”  
Goldsmith’s primary interest is to shore up the strength and 
legitimacy of the executive branch so that it will be positioned to 
deter or respond to a terrorist attack. He presumably is not intensely 
concerned with reconciling our past practices against international law 
norms or providing restitution to those brutalized by U.S. official 
conduct. And, to be fair, he seeks only to measure legitimacy within 
the U.S. constitutional system. Still, it is worth broadening our 
perspective of accountability and legitimacy and considering these 
norms from different vantage points. 
1. Victims  
A system that carries out two massive wars, a global 
counterterrorism operation of unprecedented scale and brutality, 
including brutality even Goldsmith would acknowledge was in fact 
wrong, has to acknowledge that it will impose immense costs on real 
human beings, including innocent ones. Aside from the most general 
lip service, and some court-martials of low-level military officers, the 
U.S. government has offered no meaningful accounting, apology, or 
recompense to hundreds of victims of torture, abuse, homicide, and 
unlawful detention in Abu Ghraib and other Iraqi prisons.148 While 
the Canadian government offered an apology and restitution of $10 
148. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & Eric Schmitt, President Sorry for Iraq 
Abuse; Backs Rumsfeld, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A1 (stating that 
the President failed to make an direct apology on behalf of the country 
for the abuses at Abu Ghraib).  
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million to Maher Arar,149 the United States government sought and 
received judicial “legitimation” of its conspiracy to render and torture 
him in Syria and will not utter one word of apology or contrition to 
him or his family. Human rights groups have counted many hundreds 
of innocent civilians killed by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and 
Yemen,150 an accounting that the U.S. simply defines away or 
mendaciously and arrogantly denies.151  
In his dissenting opinion in Arar v. Ashcroft, Judge Calabresi 
explained what a genuinely legitimate judicial system should 
recognize: 
Whether extraordinary rendition is constitutionally permissible 
is a question that seems to divide our country. It seems to me 
obvious, however, that regardless of the propriety of such 
renditions . . . mistakes will be made in its operation. And more 
obvious still is that a civilized polity, when it errs, admits it and 
seeks to give redress. . . . In some countries, this occurs through 
a royal commission. In the United States, for better or worse, 
courts are, almost universally, involved. This being so, and 
regardless of whether the Constitution itself requires that there 
be such redress, the object must be to create and use judicial 
structures that facilitate the giving of compensation, at least to 
innocent victims, while protecting from disclosure those facts 
that cannot be revealed without endangering national 
security.152 
This country’s inability to genuinely account for its mistakes 
represents a deep moral failure. It renders our system—certainly from 
the perspective of non-government actors—illegitimate. 
2. History 
I am not as confident that history, an admittedly ineffable 
standard, will view this current equilibrium that Goldsmith describes 
as legitimate or desirable. Who wouldn’t have described the 
interbranch ratification of the internment of Japanese-Americans as 
legitimate in 1945 and in the immediate years after? Goldsmith 
consistently argues that this time around, we have done better to 
avoid the worst mistakes of the World War II era (even as he seems 
149. Ottawa Reaches $10M Settlement with Arar, CBC (Jan. 25, 2007), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/01/25/arar-harper.html.  
150. See THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, 
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL: HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC 19–21 (2012).  
151. See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Attacks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A1. 
152. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 638 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).  
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to endorse a decision, Ex Parte Quirin, that Justice Scalia rightly 
described as representing “not th[e] Court’s finest hour”153). But I 
suspect historical judgment will be less forgiving of that kind of 
temporal relativism and pass a far more critical verdict than 
Goldsmith registers. 
3. The World  
Whatever one thinks of the legitimacy of the present legal 
landscape within the United States, one would be hard-pressed to find 
many among the other five billion people of the world who view our 
system as legitimate under any normative standard. Obama was 
awarded a Nobel Peace Prize on the expectation that he would carry 
through on his promise to close Guantanamo, restore the American 
system of justice, and end military expansionism.154 The policies he 
has carried on are a betrayal of that expectation. Likewise, consider 
Obama’s first major address to the world. It was delivered in Cairo, 
the capital of the Muslim world, in his first month of office. In that 
speech, he promised an end to the extra-legal practices of the Bush 
Administration—torture, military detention in Guantanamo, and the 
like.155 He delivered that message there because Guantanamo had such 
iconic significance in that part of the world. Since that time, 
thousands of courageous Arabs in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, 
and Syria risked their lives to throw off regimes that for years relied 
on torture, military detention, and related authoritarian practices—a 
thrilling tribute to the irresistible pull of freedom and human rights. 
Obama’s failure to live up to his promise to end the practices he 
identified in his Cairo speech has, regrettably but unsurprisingly, 
made the United States utterly irrelevant to this powerful freedom 
movement.  
V. Conclusion: A More Sinister Paradox 
As I noted in the beginning of this paper, Goldsmith identifies a 
paradox in CCR’s role in the post 9/11 decade: he suggests that by 
choosing to take on the executive in a hail-mary challenge to 
indefinite military detention in Guantanamo, CCR set in motion a 
process that, while checking the worst excesses of executive power, 
ultimately put core components of military detention on stronger legal 
footing. In other words, CCR of all places has made the presidency 
more imperial. Framed this way, the paradox has quite a sting to it.  
153. Hamdi v. Rumseld, 542 U.S. 507, 570 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
154. See Editorial, The Peace Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at A22. 
155. Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2009), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewant
ed=all&_r=0.  
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But I worry about a potentially more tragic irony coming to pass. 
By contorting our constitutional traditions in order to accommodate 
broad and permanent military power to detain, bomb, and capture 
persons (almost exclusively Muslims) all over the world; by rendering 
these practices normal and “legitimate” under U.S. law, even as they 
appear universally illegitimate to the rest of the world, and thus 
heightening antipathy toward the United States; to do so all in the 
name of preventing another terrorist attack, actually heightens the 
risk that such an attack will occur. I hope I am wrong about that 
prospect. But, I also hope Goldsmith and others who wield the levers 
of national security power will be mindful of the unintended 
consequences of the current system of accountability they 
optimistically defend.  
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